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The Tale of Two Harts;  
A Schlegelian Dialectic 
CHARLES L. BARZUN† 
[I]t is simply our total character and personal genius that are on 
trial; and if we invoke any so-called philosophy, our choice and use 
of that also are but revelations of our individual aptitude or 
incapacity for moral life. From this unsparing practical ordeal no 
professor’s lectures and no array of books can save us.1 
[I]t is only through personal, self-reliant participation, by trial and 
error, in the problems of existence, both personal and social, that 
the capacity to participate effectively can grow. Man learns wisdom 
in choosing by being confronted with choices and by being made 
aware that he must abide the consequences of his choice.2 
Good lawyers earn the big bucks you all hope to make by putting 
their butt on the line, by exercising the best possible judgment in 
circumstances where answers are unlikely and advice only possible 
in terms of better or worse alternatives.3 
 
†Horace W. Goldsmith Professor of Law, University of Virginia. For helpful 
comments and discussions on this and earlier drafts, I’d like to thank Robert 
Condlin, Peter Danchin, Neil Duxbury, Hendrik Hartog, Nicola Lacey and the 
participants in the legal theory workshop at the University of Maryland Carey 
School of Law. And a special thanks to Schlegel for the honesty, humanity, and 
humor he has brought to our conversations over two decades of friendship. 
 1. William James, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, 1 INT’L. J. 
ETHICS 330, 354 (1891). 
 2. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 401, 410 (1958).  
 3. John Henry Schlegel, To Dress for Dinner: Teaching Law in a 
Bureaucratic Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 435, 453 (2018). 
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Schlegel once relayed to me, during one of our many long 
phone chats over the years, a story about a talk he once 
delivered at Yale in the late 1980s. During the Q&A, Owen 
Fiss asked him, in a somewhat exasperated tone, “Are you 
serious, or is this a joke?” Schlegel thought about the 
question for a moment and then responded, “both.” Fiss was 
apparently not amused. But I was, by the retelling. This 
Essay is not a joke, but it does aim to say something, albeit 
indirectly, about the organizing theme of this conference: 
“serious fun.”  
I say “indirectly” because its more immediate subject 
matter is a pair of classic modern legal texts: HLA Hart’s The 
Concept of Law and the teaching materials for Henry Hart 
and Albert Sacks’s second-year course at Harvard Law 
School, The Legal Process.4 These two works are in some 
ways quite similar, including, most obviously, that they were 
both written for law students at elite universities at roughly 
the same time. But I am more interested in the differences 
between these works or, perhaps more accurately, 
differences between their authors. The differences are both 
substantive and methodological, but I will focus on the 
methodological difference because I think that it reflects an 
even deeper philosophical divide between the two thinkers.  
My argument, if you can call it that, consists of several, 
related claims. The first thing I hope to show is that the two 
Harts—whom I will call Henry and Herbert, for clarity and 
simplicity—both were attempting to deal with the same 
underlying philosophical dilemma. That dilemma arises 
from the apparent incompatibility between our ordinary 
experience of meaning and value, on the one hand, and the 
 
 4. See generally H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); HENRY M. HART, 
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
The course was taught in 1957 and most of the materials in the first chapter 
finalized by 1959. It is commonly recognized that the materials mainly reflect 
Hart’s intellectual vision and that Sacks was the junior partner. See HART & 
SACKS, supra, at lxxvii–lxxxv. 
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mechanistic image of the world offered by modern science, on 
the other. The two Harts, however, took very different 
approaches to dealing with this dilemma, owing largely to 
the different philosophical traditions within which each was 
working. 
My second point is that today we live in Herbert’s world. 
That is true not only because his account of the nature of law 
remains the dominant one, but also because of a broader 
picture of law, and its relation to other disciplines of 
knowledge, that it has encouraged. In that picture, 
normative and doctrinal forms of scholarship are offered 
from an “internal” perspective on law, whereas historians 
and the social scientists study law from an “external” 
perspective.5 This tacit view of legal practice and theory has 
penetrated so deeply and pervasively that we cannot help but 
see Henry’s own contributions to legal theory in its terms, 
relegating it to the “internal” side of the dichotomy.  
For reasons I’ll explain, though, I think Henry himself 
would have rejected that interpretation. I thus propose 
conducting a thought-experiment that imagines a reversal of 
explanatory roles. What if, rather than explaining Henry’s 
theory of law in the terms of Herbert’s, we explained 
Herbert’s theory of law in terms of Henry’s? More generally, 
how would such a picture alter our understanding of how law 
as a “discipline” relates to other forms of knowledge? 
Answering this last question will bring us back to 
Schlegel. I will argue that Schlegel’s thinking about law, 
history, and disciplines in general can be seen as part of the 
tradition to which Henry, rather than Herbert, belongs. That 
may sound counter-intuitive—paradoxical, even—since 
Schlegel was himself part of the critical legal studies 
 
 5. See generally Charles L. Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal-
External Distinction in Legal Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV. 1203 (2015) 
[hereinafter Inside-Out]. The current essay draws on, and develops further, 
points made in that article as well as those made in Charles L. Barzun, The 
Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1, 51–52 (2013) 
[hereinafter Forgotten Foundations]. 
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movement, one of whose primary targets was the legal-
process approach Henry epitomized. Maybe it is paradoxical, 
but no more so than an instruction to have serious fun. 
I. 
The Concept of Law and The Legal Process are in many 
ways quite similar. But there are some critical differences. 
The question I’ll raise is, what explains those differences? 
The similarities between the two books extend beyond 
the primary authors’ last names and the fact that they were 
both written for law students. Both works put procedure at 
the heart (no pun intended) of law and legal systems. In The 
Concept of Law, Herbert argued that the “key to the science 
of jurisprudence” was to recognize that what enabled the 
concept of “legal validity” to have any meaning was, in part, 
the existence of “secondary” or “power-conferring” rules that 
offer criteria for establishing which “primary” rules of 
conduct qualified as law. Such secondary rules enable courts 
and officials to (1) determine which primary rules count as 
legal rules, (2) change primary rules through certain 
procedures, and (3) apply and enforce the primary rules. 
Such secondary rules “remedied” the “defects” of a society 
governed exclusively by primary rules of conduct.6  
At the same time, in Chapter 1 of the Legal Process 
teaching materials, Henry argued for something very 
similar. He explained that although people living in society 
often have competing interests or “wants,” they all have an 
interest in living together in peace. Therefore, they develop 
both “substantive arrangements” as to how to allocate 
resources and “procedural” or “constitutive” arrangements as 
to decide how to create, change, and enforce those 
substantive arrangements. Given that such procedural 
arrangements are both the source of the substantive 
arrangements and the means by which they are applied, 
 
 6. See HART, supra note 4, at 91–98. 
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procedural arrangements are, in Hart’s word “obviously 
more fundamental” than the substantive arrangements.7 
Substitute “secondary rules” for “procedural arrangements” 
and “primary rules” for “substantive arrangements” and you 
have something like Herbert’s rule of recognition.  
The striking similarity between these two accounts 
corresponds to many similarities in their authors. Henry and 
Herbert were born three years apart (1904 and 1907, 
respectively), both spent part of their career practicing law, 
both participated in the war effort, and both then devoted 
themselves to legal teaching and scholarship in what were at 
the time their respective homeland’s leading universities, 
Harvard and Oxford. The two Harts even spent a year 
teaching at the same university, when Herbert visited 
Harvard for the 1956-57 academic year—during which time 
Henry was working on his teaching materials and Herbert 
was working on the book that became The Concept of Law.8  
They also shared a broadly similar scholarly agenda. 
While at Harvard, Henry and Herbert both participated in a 
“Legal Philosophy Discussion Group,” along with Lon Fuller, 
Morton White, and others. There they circulated papers 
about the nature of courts, rules, discretion and other issues 
central to the “rule of law”—a particularly salient concern in 
the postwar period.9 In this way, both works could be seen as 
“responses” to—because they included criticisms of—legal 
realism and its perceived threat to traditional legal values.10  
In short, from the perspective of today’s academy—one 
more diverse than theirs in so many respects, including those 
of race, class, sex, and disciplinary method, among many 
 
 7. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
 8. See NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H. L. A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE 
NOBLE DREAM 179, 190 (2004). 
 9. See id. at 188. See also Forgotten Foundations, supra note 5, at 51–52.  
 10. See Forgotten Foundations, supra note 5, at 3–4 (collecting citations to 
scholars that have characterized the teaching materials in this way); HART, supra 
note 4, at 136–47 (discussing and criticizing the “rule skepticism” of the realists).  
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others—the two Harts seem materially indistinguishable. 
Both were white, male lawyers of the same generation who 
operated within, and at the pinnacle of, a white, male legal 
establishment—an establishment which saw itself as 
charged with articulating and defending postwar 
understandings of democracy and the rule of law.11  
Yet in some ways the two Harts’ contributions to legal 
thought point in quite different directions, substantively and 
methodologically. Let’s take substance first. The two works 
seem to reach very different conclusions with respect to one 
of the most fundamental questions at stake in any discussion 
of the meaning and value of the “rule of law,” namely 
whether citizens have a duty to obey the law.  
A comparison of two passages from each of their works 
conveys the difference well. In the first chapter of the Hart 
& Sacks teaching materials, the authors state that the 
“central idea of law” is what they call the “principle of 
institutional settlement,” according to which each individual 
in society has a duty to comply with “decisions which are the 
duly arrived at result of duly established procedures . . . 
unless and until they are duly changed.”12 The materials 
then go on to state that although we say in common speech 
that the law “is” such and such, “yet the ‘is’ is not really an 
‘is’ but a special kind of ‘ought.’”13 So, for Henry, there is such 
a duty.  
Compare that passage to one of the more famous 
passages in The Concept of Law, where Herbert explains why 
it is so important to recognize the independence of law from 
morality:  
What surely is most needed in order to make men clear-sighted in 
confronting the official abuse of power, is that they should preserve 
the sense that the certification of something as legally valid is not 
 
 11. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY: 
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 235–45 (1973). 
 12. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 4. 
 13. Id. at 5. 
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conclusive of the question of obedience, and that, however great the 
aura of majesty or authority which the official system may have, its 
demands must in the end be submitted to a moral scrutiny.14 
Herbert here rejects the idea that the legal validity of 
some directive is sufficient to compel the obedience of those 
ruled by it. 
Henry and Herbert thus seem to draw nearly opposite 
conclusions from almost identical premises. Both see the 
existence of law as essentially connected not only to certain 
procedures, but to the acceptance of those procedures as the 
proper ones for resolving conflicts about the substantive 
norms that govern society. But whereas Henry infers from 
that fact something like a moral obligation to abide by the 
outcomes of such procedures, the lesson Herbert draws is 
just the reverse: since the rules validated by those 
procedures only count as “legal” because of the mere fact that 
they have been accepted by officials in the legal system as 
law-validating ones, citizens must subject those rules to 
moral scrutiny before assuming that obedience to them is 
required. 
This contrast prompts a question: why do these two men, 
whose scholarly agendas and ideological assumptions are 
otherwise so similar, come to such different conclusions 
about something as fundamental as the power of law to 
morally compel obedience? Answering this question reveals 
the second, methodological difference between the two 
works.  
Herbert’s own theory suggests one explanation. His 
advance over John Austin’s form of positivism was achieved 
in part by distinguishing between two “points of view” with 
respect to what Hart called a “social rule.” Those who view a 
rule from the “internal” point of view see the rule as a 
standard of evaluation or a justification for complying with 
it, whereas those who take the “external” point of view 
simply use it to predict how those living under it may behave. 
 
 14. HART, supra note 4, at 210. 
16 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
For Hart, a legal system required some set of people, possibly 
only the “officials” of a legal system, to take the “internal 
point of view” of the ultimate rule of recognition.15 From that 
perspective (but only from that perspective), the secondary 
rules that authorize the promulgation and enforcement of 
the primary rules of conduct are seen to be legitimate, or at 
least demand (in some normative sense) official compliance.  
Thus, Herbert’s theory offers an obvious explanation for 
why the Hart & Sacks teaching materials treat the American 
legal system as one that compels obedience. Its authors 
adopted the “internal point of view” with respect to the 
American constitutional order. Henry, after all, assumed 
that he was teaching the future legal and political elite of the 
country (and so he was—at one point a majority of the 
members of the Supreme Court were former students of 
Harvard’s Legal Process course16), so it is obvious why he 
would be interested in endorsing (we might even say 
legitimating) the current legal regime. 
That explanation is consistent with how the legal-
process tradition has been treated and understood by legal 
philosophers. Hart’s most famous antagonist, Ronald 
Dworkin, whose theory of law owes much to the legal-process 
school, himself embraced the “internal point of view,” albeit 
in slightly modified form.17 In Law’s Empire (1986), Dworkin 
announced at the outset that in elaborating his theory of law 
he would not take the explanatory perspective of an 
“historian or sociologist” but would instead adopt the 
“internal point of view” of the judge, who seeks practical 
arguments about what to do.18 At the same time, other legal 
philosophers have interpreted (charitably, in their view) 
 
 15. HART, supra note 4, at 116. 
 16. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at cxxv. 
 17. See Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The 
Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 413–14 (1987); Forgotten 
Foundations, supra note 5, at 29 (observing that “Hart and Sacks seemed to 
foreshadow the work of Ronald Dworkin”).  
 18. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 14 (1986). 
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legal-process theorists as adopting something like the 
“internal point of view.”19 They were, after all, lawyers, not 
sociologists, historians, or philosophers.  
Moreover, we legal scholars today still operate according 
to the conceptual dichotomy Herbert’s theory of law set in 
motion. The distinction between “internal” and “external” 
forms of legal scholarship is now entrenched.20 Normative, 
interpretive and doctrinal work is characterized as 
“internal”—the kind of stuff a practicing lawyer might 
conceivably (even if not actually) use—whereas social-
scientific, empirical or explanatory work is treated as 
“external” scholarship.21 In fact, the dichotomy has become 
so entrenched in the legal academy that those who 
transgress it are accused of committing a “fallacy.”22  
However entrenched the dichotomy may now be, though, 
it was not how Henry saw things, at least not as expressed 
in the Legal Process materials and much of his other writing. 
Far from taking the basic legitimacy of current legal practice 
as a starting assumption, the materials try to provide a 
quasi-sociological foundation for law by explaining why it 
might it have a claim to obedience.23 And far from adopting 
the “judge’s” point of view, one of the main tasks of the 
materials is to convey to students how differently various 
actors within a legal system might look at the same problem. 
Consider this passage, which concludes a discussion of “the 
nature of institutional decisions”:  
Are the positions which have been taken thus far in these 
materials conventional and generally accepted? Might a 
 
 19. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Fuller’s Internal Point of View, 13 L. & PHIL. 
285, 302 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler 
Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 972 (1994).  
 20. Inside-Out, supra note 5, at 1207.  
 21. See id. at 1207–08. 
 22. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2013). 
 23. See HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 1; Forgotten Foundations, supra note 
5, at 20–21.  
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representative chairman of the Republic National Committee, for 
example, be expected to agree with them? A chairman of the 
Democratic National Committee? A representative union leader? A 
representative president of the United States Chamber of 
Commerce? Of the American Bar Association? A representative 
member of the Soviet Russian Politburo? A younger professor of 
anthropology in an American university representative of the most 
recent trend of thought in this field? Of economics? History? 
Philosophy? Political science? Psychology? Sociology?  
Does it make any difference to a hard-headed practicing lawyer 
whether the positions are accepted or rejected—or simply ignored?24 
This passage hardly suggests a work that adopts the 
judge’s, lawyer’s, or any other “internal” point of view. Far 
from shutting off other disciplinary perspectives on 
commonly held legal assumptions, the materials explicitly 
invite comparison to them. Indeed, the “hard-headed 
practicing lawyer” is only introduced as a skeptic of the entire 
enterprise, not as its personification.25 Rather, what the 
materials encourage students to develop was an 
“Olympian”—one might even say a philosophical—
perspective on law.26 
It may appear that I have sought to liberate Henry’s 
ambitions from shackles of Herbert’s internal/external point-
of-view dichotomy only at the cost of ascribing to him an 
unattractive and unjustified lawyerly arrogance. Even 
putting aside the impossibility of ever attaining a “neutral” 
or “Olympian” perspective on political and legal questions,27 
 
 24. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 113. 
 25. In notes for an unpublished lecture, Hart described Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s skeptical, predictive approach to law as “hard-headed.” See Henry Hart, 
The Morality of Function 1–4 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard 
Law Library). 
 26. See HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 67 (providing a series of questions 
about a case problem under the subheading “The Problem from an Olympian 
Point of View” and concluding that “[a]ll the rest of these materials are designed 
to cast light on the questions under this last subheading”).  
 27. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You Better Believe it, 25 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFFS. 87 (1996) (denying the possibility of attaining an “Archimedean 
point” that “stand[s] outside a whole body of belief, and to judge it as a whole 
from premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it”). Cf. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
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it seems, at the very least, to encourage lawyers to think that 
they can do philosophy—or economics or sociology or 
psychology—without bothering to ensure competency in 
those fields. Such an attitude reflects what Mark Tushnet 
calls the “lawyer as astrophysicist” assumption, according to 
which the “generalist training of lawyers allows any lawyer 
to read a text on astrophysics over the weekend and launch 
a rocket on Monday.”28 If anything like that assumption was 
ever justified, so this objection goes, it no longer is.29 
But I think this misunderstands what Henry was trying 
to achieve in asking students to try to imagine such a 
perspective. He was not assuming that one could actually 
achieve a perspective-less perspective. Rather, he was 
emphasizing that lawyers are constantly put in situations 
where they have to make a decision one way or another—
whether to grant a plaintiff’s motion, whether to take a 
party’s case, whether (and if so, how) to make an argument 
in court, whether (and if so, how) to enforce a legislative 
command—even though it may be far from clear what the 
best decision would be. This is even true—it is especially 
true—when the decision is about whose facts to believe, what 
authority to trust, or to which institution to defer.30 
 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960 271 (1992) (criticizing “the 1950s 
search for ‘neutral principles’” as expressing a “yearning to find an Olympian 
position from which to objectively cushion the terrors of social choice”).  
 28. Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation 
of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1338 n.140 
(1979). 
 29. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 
1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 763 (1987) (observing that the confidence in 
law’s “autonomy as a discipline” was “empirically supported” at the time Posner 
was in law school).  
 30. See HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 112 (“The further examination of the 
nature of the process of institutional decision, and of the problems involved in 
making and appraising the decisions in each of the major types of institutional 
processes [e.g., adjudication, voting, etc.], is the concern of these materials from 
this beginning to the end.”); id. at 149 (explaining that “there may be thought to 
be a justification for describing [a magistrate’s] act of interpretation as one of 
discretion . . . . But this would be obscure what seems to be the vital point—
namely, the effort, and the importance of the effort, of each individual deciding 
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Deliberating about such questions requires looking at them 
from different angles and then coming to a judgment about 
what to believe and what to do.31  
Under this view, far from being a condition for practical 
reasoning, the lawyer’s aspiration to achieve the “Olympian” 
perspective is simply the perspective that is entailed by 
whatever decision she ends up making. It is the goal, not the 
starting point; the conclusion, not the premise.32 And if 
seeking such a perspective counts as “philosophy,” then legal 
practice is inescapably philosophical. So understood, the 
aspiration reflects not so much Henry’s faith in the 
intellectual prowess of his students as it did his insistence on 
their ultimate moral responsibility for their decisions. As 
Henry put it elsewhere, “[m]an learns wisdom in choosing by 
being confronted with choices and by being made aware that 
he must abide the consequences of his choice.”33 
II. 
If explaining Henry’s theory in terms of Herbert’s cannot 
make sense of what Henry actually wrote, how about the 
reverse? What if we explained Herbert’s theory in terms of 
Henry’s? That is exactly what I’d like to do. Doing so, 
however, first requires understanding the philosophical 
traditions in which each of the two Harts was operating. 
Then we can see how interpreting their work in light of those  
  
 
officer to reach what he thinks is the right answer”). 
 31. Id. at 110 (“[T[he conclusions of the science [of society] must depend 
ultimately upon judgment—upon judgment informed by experience and by all the 
objective data that can feasibly be assembled, but upon judgment nevertheless. 
The chief business of a student of the science, therefore, is to train his 
judgment.”). 
 32. Id. at 67 (explaining that “[a]ll the rest of these materials are designed to 
cast light on the questions under [the subheading ‘The Problem from the 
Olympian Point of View’]” but clarifying that “[t]he questions are put at this point 
to invite reflection and not with any thought that what has so far been presented 
makes possible a confident answer”). 
 33. HART, supra note 2, at 410. 
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traditions might revise the conventional reading of Herbert’s 
great work.  
The two Harts worked in quite different intellectual 
traditions. Whereas Herbert was immersed in the ordinary-
language philosophy that dominated Oxford at the time, 
Henry was operating within a legal tradition deeply 
influenced by American pragmatism.34 Let me say a few—
inevitably crude and over-simplified—words about each of 
these philosophical traditions.  
Both traditions developed as an effort to solve the same 
philosophical problem, though they did so in different ways. 
The problem is how to reconcile our commonsense experience 
of the world with the image of the world delivered by modern 
science. In our everyday lives, concepts like knowledge, 
mind, agency, meaning, and value make sense and have 
significance for us. But from the perspective of science or, as 
Thomas Nagel puts it, the “view from nowhere,” it is not clear 
how they can attach to anything in the physical world; it is 
hard to know where to place them or, therefore, how to make 
sense of them.35 So when it comes to understanding those 
critical concepts, which ought we trust, our “subjective” 
experience of the world or the “objective” description of the 
world offered by science? We can call this philosophical 
problem the Essential Dilemma. 
  
 
 34. I have discussed both in previous work. See Forgotten Foundations, supra 
note 5, at 2–25 (discussing influence of William James and Roscoe Pound on 
Hart); Inside-Out, supra note 5, at 1213 (discussing influence of Gilbert Ryle, J. 
L. Austin and other linguistic philosophers on Hart); see also Leslie Green, 
“Introduction to The Concept of Law,” in HART, supra note 4, at xlvii (same). 
 35. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 3 (1986) (“This book is 
about a single problem: how to combine the perspective of a particular person 
inside the world with an objective view of that same world, the person and his 
viewpoint included.”). Philosophers today sometimes refer to this as the 
“placement problem.” See David Macarthur & Huw Price, Pragmatism, Quasi-
Realism, and the Global Challenge, in NEW PRAGMATISTS 93–95 (Cheryl Misak 
ed., 2007); see also Charles L. Barzun, Metaphysical Quietism and Functional 
Explanation in Law, 34 L. & PHIL. 89, 92 (2015) (discussing and criticizing 
Macarthur and Price’s solution to the placement problem). 
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Both traditions took this dilemma seriously in one sense: 
neither thought that opting for one horn of it was an 
acceptable route. We cannot abandon the empiricist methods 
that have produced so much knowledge about, and 
technological progress in, the world; but nor can we dismiss 
talk of human value as meaningless.36 In this way, both 
responses rejected extreme forms of idealism or rationalism, 
on the one hand, and materialism and empiricism, on the 
other.37 Both insisted that another path must be found. 
But the two traditions differed as to how they forged that 
alternative path. Ordinary-language philosophers sought to 
defuse or deflate the dilemma by suggesting that it only 
arises from confusions produced by our language. To use 
Gilbert Ryle’s example, we say that “minds exist,” and that 
“bodies exist.” But we fail to see that when we do so we mean 
different things by “exist,” just as, when we say “the tide is 
rising” and “hopes are rising,” we use the same word to refer 
to two distinct relations. Both are intelligible uses of the 
term, but they carry different meanings, depending on what 
we are trying to do or say in any particular context.38 So 
understood, the mind-body problem (which is one instance of 
the Essential Dilemma) is revealed to be what Ryle called a 
“category mistake”—falsely thinking, for example, that 
“mind” belongs to the same category of phenomena that 
bodies do. Such a way of thinking reflects, in Ryle’s famous 
phrase, “the dogma of the ghost in the machine.” Under this 
view, then, the Essential Dilemma is a kind of illusion that, 
once revealed as such, dissolves away, leaving only the  
  
 
 36. That was the view associated with logical positivism. See, e.g., ALFRED 
JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 38–39 (2d ed. 1946) (“[I]t is the mark 
of a genuine factual proposition . . . that some experiential propositions can be 
deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises without being 
deducible from those other premises alone.”). 
 37. Technically, idealism and materialism refer to metaphysical theses, while 
rationalism and empiricism refer to epistemological ones, but the pairs tend to 
travel together. 
 38. See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16 (1949). 
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particulars of linguistic usage for philosophers to study and 
analyze with precision. 
The pragmatist path—or at least the one forged by the 
particular strand of pragmatism that I’m tempted to call the 
existentialist strand—took a very different approach.39 
Rather than claiming that neither horn need be chosen 
because the dilemma itself arises from confusion, it suggests 
that both horns can be—indeed, must be—chosen. The 
reason is that our theoretical reasoning (about what there is 
in the world) is both driven by practical concerns (about what 
matters, what is good) and is (therefore) properly evaluated 
by reference to practical criteria.40 Under this view, then, 
“minds” exist in the world if (and only if) our theories that 
treat them as real work well for us, enabling us to create a 
world that has meaning and value for us.41 As William James 
put it, the whole notion of “truth” is “essentially bound up 
with the way in which one moment in our experience may 
lead us towards other moments which it will be worthwhile 
to have been led to.”42 So, according to this view, the 
Essential Dilemma is very real, but we resolve it for 
ourselves every time we make a decision about what to 
believe or what to do. 
We can see, then, that the two traditions advance nearly 
opposite approaches to resolving the dilemma without opting 
for one horn or the other. According to the first, the dilemma 
just reflects a linguistic confusion, so neither horn need be (or 
 
 39. It is a strand I associate most closely with William James. See Forgotten 
Foundations, supra note 5, at 22–25. Others have noted the similarity between 
James’s views and those of European existentialist philosophers. See, e.g., 
WILLIAM BARRETT, IRRATIONAL MAN 18–19 (1958) (“Of all the non-European 
philosophers, William James probably best deserves to be labeled an 
Existentialist. . . . There are pages in James that could have been written by 
Kierkegaard”). 
 40. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF 
THINKING 203 (1907) (“The possession of truth, so far from being here an end in 
itself, is only a preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions.”). 
 41. See id. at 204.  
 42. Id. at 204–05. 
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ought to be) chosen. According to the second, the dilemma is 
inescapable and yet irresolvable, so that, in some sense, both 
must be chosen. 
Arguably, neither of these responses is satisfying, in part 
because each could be seen as effectively choosing one horn 
of the original dilemma after all. The linguistic philosophers 
essentially treat the dilemma as a theoretical one, 
susceptible to traditional philosophical analysis and in no 
way threatening to modern science. Linguistic usage is 
simply treated as a form of human behavior capable of being 
observed and analyzed like any other behavior.43 But if so, 
then one is still left with a question: when we analyze how 
people use ethical terms, are we learning something about 
ethics or just about how (some) people talk about ethics? 
Unless it’s the former, we have not really escaped the 
dilemma, and yet going that route seemed to invite the kind 
of metaphysical worries that originally prompted the 
dilemma. 
Meantime, the pragmatist treats the dilemma as a 
practical one that constantly demands choices about what to 
do (and, therefore, judgments about what there is). That is 
so because, under this view, questions about what to believe 
are inevitably answered (and properly so) by reference to 
practical considerations. Yet, this solution fails to do justice 
to the deep epistemic intuitions that lead to the dilemma in 
the first place. It seems hard to shake the thought that there 
is a difference in principle between some fact or theory being 
true and it being useful, or valuable, or fit for a better world, 
however defined. And yet, taken literally, the pragmatist 
approach seems to leave such a difference unintelligible. 
If the above analysis is correct, then the Essential 
Dilemma just recurs in a slightly modified, second-order 
form: is the problem of reconciling our commonsense 
 
 43. Julia Tanney, Rethinking Ryle: A Critical Discussion of The Concept of 
Mind, in THE CONCEPT OF MIND, at xxii-xxiii (Gilbert Ryle ed., 2009) (noting the 
criticism of Ryle’s work that it amounts to a defense of behaviorism). 
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“subjective” experience with “objective” methods of gaining 
knowledge a theoretical problem about what to believe there 
is in the world or is it a practical problem about what to do? 
And the same kinds of responses could be offered: It is 
neither because it arises from a confusion (ordinary 
philosophy), or it is both because every decision one makes is 
a decision that reflects practical and theoretical 
commitments (pragmatism). Infinite regress looms. 
Now let’s get back to law and legal theory. As the title of 
his book indicates, Herbert opted for the same route as his 
fellow Oxford linguistic philosophers.44 As it relates to law, 
the Essential Dilemma poses the question of whether law is 
best understood as an element of practical reasoning 
(natural law) or is simply a brute fact (positivism). We can 
now see that Herbert’s distinction between two “points of 
view” is just the linguistic philosophers’ approach to 
resolving that dilemma.45 Those who take the internal point 
of view, use words like “ought” and “should” and so treat the 
rule of recognition as a rational standard or criterion for legal 
validity. But others may take the “external” point of view and 
so treat such rules as only indicators of behavioral 
regularities.46 Just as with Ryle, one can make an existence 
claim from both points of view, but when they are made, each 
means something different by saying that the law “is” X. 
From the internal point of view, such a statement implies a 
normative judgment about what a person to whom the rule 
applies ought to do (“rules passed by Congress and the signed 
by the President must be enforced as law”); from the 
external, a merely factual one about official behavior (“judges  
  
 
 44. Compare Gilbert Ryle, THE CONCEPT OF MIND, with H. L. A. Hart, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW. See also Green, supra note 34. 
 45. But see Green, supra note 34, at xlvii (observing that, despite the influence 
of Ryle and Austin on Hart, “what is most striking, given its vintage and 
provenance, is how little linguistic analysis there is in the Concept of Law”). 
 46. HART, supra note 4, at 89. 
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tend to treat as law rules passed by Congress and signed by 
the President”).47 
Henry, meanwhile, took the (existentialist) pragmatist’s 
approach. He, too, recognized that from the perspective of a 
social scientist, one could look at the American legal system 
as a natural scientist would look at the behavior of an 
amoeba.48 But rather than simply treating that as another, 
equally valid, “external” point of view with respect to the 
foundational rules of the legal system, he sought to reconcile 
and combine such a scholarly perspective with that of a 
lawyer practicing law, whether as an advocate, a legislator, 
judge, or executive officer. That meant that the choice of 
research methods was itself an ethical choice, as judged at 
least in part by what the effect of taking such a view might 
be.49 According to Henry, all such lawyers were concerned 
with what the teaching materials call the “science of society,” 
namely the field of knowledge related to institutional 
processes of social decision-making.50 Such a science, in his 
view, was partly empirical, partly normative. Hence, the 
teaching materials repeatedly refer to law as a “prudential” 
or “judgmatical” science.51 
With these considerations in mind, we can now pose the 
thought experiment mentioned at the outset. What would it 
look like to explain Herbert’s legal theory in the terms of 
Henry’s? The answer, I think, is that, under Henry’s 
approach, The Concept of Law is revealed to be a work of 
profound ambivalence as to the power of law to compel 
obedience. Why? Well, under Henry’s pragmatist view, both 
law and legal theory are properly guided by, and subject to 
evaluation by reference to, practical criteria (about what to  
  
 
 47. Id. 
 48. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 108.  
 49. I offer more textual support for this claim in Barzun, supra note 5. 
 50. Id. at 107.  
 51. Id. 
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do). And yet, the relevant practical implications of Herbert’s 
theory cut in opposite directions. 
On the one hand, Herbert wants to suggest (just as 
Henry did) that having generally recognized procedures for 
generating and identifying some rule as “law” is inherently 
valuable insofar as such procedures offer a means for the 
peaceful resolution of social conflict.52 If that is so, then a 
norm’s status as “legally valid” would seem to be at least 
relevant to, even if not dispositive on, the question of 
whether it deserves obedience. And indeed, Herbert 
sometimes says things that imply exactly that, such as in the 
passage quoted above.53 
On the other hand, though, Herbert insists that whether 
something counts as law is, from the “external” perspective, 
entirely a factual question about the behavior of officials—
namely, which rules they treat as legally valid. The views of 
the people actually living under those rules are irrelevant. 
As Hart says, those people’s attitudes can be “deplorably 
sheeplike” and “the sheep can end up in the 
slaughterhouse.”54 That view can explain why the Nazis had 
“law,” but it does so at the cost of explaining why judges or 
citizens would have even a prima facie obligation to treat 
such law as compelling any obedience whatsoever.55 
 
 52. HART, supra note 4, at 94–98 (explaining how the introduction of 
secondary rules of recognition “remedy” the “defects” of a system with only 
primary rules of obligation). 
 53. See supra, p.18 and text accompanying note 52; HART, supra note 4, at 
210. 
 54. Id. at 117. 
 55. I understand Lon Fuller to have been making a similar criticism of an 
earlier version of Hart’s argument when he complained that the “dilemma” that 
Hart suggests, an unjust law, presents the citizen with the following: “[t]he verbal 
formulation of a problem, but the problem it states makes no sense. It is like 
saying I have to choose between giving food to a starving man and being mimsy 
with the borogoves.” Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to 
Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 656 (1957). I should note here that more or 
less everything I say in this Essay about Henry Hart’s philosophical ambitions 
could also be said of Fuller’s, a fact which may bear on how one should understand 
the so-called Hart-Fuller debate. 
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Interestingly, Herbert’s biographer has concluded that 
Hart experienced anxiety over precisely this tension. After 
examining Herbert’s notebooks, Nicola Lacey observes that 
he “struggled with the concept of legal obligation” and that 
he hoped that his concept of legal obligation “would be the 
linchpin of his delicate middle way between Realism or crude 
positivism and natural law.”56 That middle way was enabled 
by his division between two “points of view,” one “internal” 
and normative and the other “external” and sociological. But 
ultimately, Lacey concludes, “Herbert was never convinced 
that he had satisfactorily resolved this dilemma about the 
restricted, but genuinely normative, notion of obligation in 
law.”57 
He was not the only one. Henry, too, was unconvinced by 
his own effort to reconcile fact and value—to accommodate 
both scientific and moral knowledge. But he dealt with the 
issue, and the problem it presented for him, more openly and 
directly. When he was invited to be the first Harvard Faculty 
member to give the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures in 1963, 
Henry entitled his lectures “Conversations about Law and 
Justice.”58 They took the form of an imagined Socratic 
dialogue between Henry and a second-year law student with 
“an undergraduate education in behavioral political science.” 
In the first lecture, he put these words in his fictitious and 
skeptical student: “I’m having trouble getting my bearings in 
the law. What really troubles me is not so much the question 
of the nature of law, but the question of knowledge about it. 
How do we connect the law and what we know about law with 
the way things are in the world?”59 
 
 56. LACEY, supra note 8, at 228. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Michael J. Henry, Hart Converses on Law and Justice, 36 HARV. L. REC. 
7–8 (1963).  
 59. Id. Cf. David Plunkett and Scott Shapiro, Law, Morality, and Everything 
Else: General Jurisprudence as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry, 128 ETHICS 
37, 44 (2017) (defining general jurisprudence as a form of “metalegal inquiry” 
which “aims to explain how legal thought, talk, and reality fit into reality”).  
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Ultimately, Henry was never able to answer that 
question to his own satisfaction. By some reports, he 
abruptly ended his final lecture, having declared that he had 
failed in his endeavor. But in the process, he made clear that 
for him, recognizing the inherent difficulty of the problem 
was part of the solution. He did so by wondering aloud what 
it would be like if “ethical philosophers by purely secular 
reasoning were able to tell us with ruthless scientific 
exactitude just what it means for things and actions to be 
good.”60 In a passage worth quoting in full, he explained why 
he considered this possibility more a nightmare than dream: 
All that would be left for Man would be to summon the power of 
will to do what the ethical philosophers told him to do. What then 
would become of human dignity and the responsibility upon which 
human dignity rests? It is the mission of Man on earth to try to find 
out about these things for himself, or else to make his peace with 
God and to accept the basic principles upon faith.61 
In short, the anxiety Herbert reserved for his diary, 
Henry made a central pillar of his legal and social 
philosophy. 
III. 
The difference just identified between the two Harts 
bears on the question of law’s status as a “discipline” of 
knowledge and its relation to other disciplines. It does so 
because their contrasting responses to the Essential 
Dilemma correspond to two different ways of understanding 
the nature of disciplinary knowledge itself. Because Schlegel 
has himself long chafed against one of these ways of 
understanding it, his thoughts on the subjects of law, history, 
and disciplinary knowledge will usefully illuminate the 
contrast. 
It is not too hard to see that the academic division of 
labor, entrenched in the modern university and often 
 
 60. Henry, supra note 58, at 7. 
 61. Id.  
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replicated within law schools, offers the same strategy for 
resolving the Essential Dilemma that Herbert did: divide 
and defuse. What is the distinction between “internal” and 
“external” points of view other than an erection of a 
disciplinary boundary in generic form? Sure, from the 
perspective of lawyers and judges, and the legal scholars who 
write for them (or a constructed version of them), the 
foundational criteria of legal validity in our society carries 
normative weight. But to “external” historians or to political 
scientists who study the legal system in their official capacity 
they are just brute facts about how people speak and behave 
about certain things and are thus of no intrinsic moral 
significance. So who is right: Does marking something as 
“law” constitute an evaluative judgment, or merely a factual 
one? Well, it depends on whom you ask.  
It is but a short step from such logic to a more global 
approach that sees each of the various disciplines as offering 
different “perspectives” on legal practice, each contributing 
something interesting but inoffensive and unthreatening to 
others. Everyone is kept contented so long as everyone else 
sticks to their own turf. The handful of academics who call 
themselves “legal philosophers” can argue endlessly about 
the “nature” of law. But no need to bother with that question 
ourselves; better that we get along and get on with our own 
thing.62 
But that response, as we have seen, treats the Essential 
Dilemma as a purely theoretical one. For Henry, it was 
practical as well. That is why he thought it an evasion of 
responsibility to relegate the study and evaluation of law to 
other disciplines.63 Law, in his view, was a craft that required 
learning how legal institutions, from courts to legislatures to 
agencies to regimes of contract, worked and one that 
 
 62. Elsewhere I have described (and criticized) this sort of view as “quietist.” 
See Barzun, supra note 35, at 89. 
 63. See Henry, supra note 57, at 7 (“However, law too, [Professor Hart] noted, 
has been dogged by the idea of rooting itself in the facts and letting some other 
discipline take the responsibility for the evaluations”). 
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demanded techniques for maintaining and improving those 
institutions.64 It is at once practical and theoretical. Often 
lawyers must defer to experts, or to some other institutional 
authority, but identifying the circumstances in which that is 
true itself requires understanding and judgment.  
Under this view, then, law is not simply a social 
institution that can be viewed from the “inside” by the actors 
who work within it as well as from the “outside” by social 
scientists who take it as an object of study.65 Rather, it is 
itself a “science of society” that strives to make use of the 
best, even if inevitably incomplete and uncertain, knowledge 
we have of the world in order to resolve various forms of 
social and political conflict. It is this ambition to see law as a 
way of simultaneously thinking about and engaging in the 
world—in other words, law as a “prudential science”—that is 
obscured when we treat legal-process theory through the lens 
of Herbert’s internal/external dichotomy. 
This ambition, to see law as craft and a way of thinking 
about the world, is a capacious one that can take many forms. 
Schlegel is proof of that. There is irony, of course, in 
suggesting that Schlegel is an heir to Henry’s philosophical 
approach. Not only was Schlegel part of the Critical Legal 
Studies movement, one of whose central targets was the 
legal-process school of Hart and his contemporaries,66 but 
 
 64. Cf. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 113 (explaining that “speaking 
intelligibly and sensibly to the future” is one of the techniques “at the heart of 
the lawyer’s craft”). 
 65. That may be because law is not like a circle or box, with an inside and 
outside, but rather a mobius strip or Klein Bottle, which is a three-dimensional 
shape with only one side. See John Henry Schlegel, The Ten Thousand Dollar 
Question, 41 STAN. L. REV. 435, 450 (1989) (suggesting that these shapes are 
better metaphors than a circle for the “hermeneutic circle”). For an illustration of 
a “Klein Bottle,” see Appendix.  
 66. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976) (explaining that one of the two 
primary theses of his article is to vindicate the intuition that “substantive and 
formal conflict in private law cannot be reduced to disagreement about how to 
apply some neutral calculus that will ‘maximize the total satisfactions of valid 
human wants’”) (quoting and citing HART & SACKS, supra note 4). 
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Schlegel is himself no fan of Henry’s. I base that judgment 
primarily on conversations we have had about legal-process 
theory, as well as the copy of the teaching materials that 
Schlegel had marked up when a student, which he sent me 
once when I was working on an article about them. In the 
margin next to the paragraph about constitutive 
arrangements of a society being “obviously more 
fundamental” than the substantive arrangements—
arguably the core assumption of the entire set of teaching 
materials and legal-process theory as a whole—Schlegel had 
written just one word: “Nonsense.” As a law-school student, 
Schlegel found the portrait those materials offered of the 
legal system to bear little if any resemblance to how legal 
power was actually exerted by real human beings living in 
cities and towns across the country.67  
But the resemblance is real. Consider a recent essay of 
Schlegel’s, published in this law review.68 In that essay, he 
describes the difficulty with which he is confronted by 
teaching at a time when students have no sense of what it 
means to be cultivated in the arts of lawyering. “[S]tudents,” 
Schlegel observes, “do not appear to equate wanting to be a 
lawyer with wanting to be a good lawyer—a skillful lawyer, 
a successful lawyer, a winning lawyer, a decent and ethical 
lawyer, a lawyer who knows the craft.”69 That fact is 
lamentable to Schlegel because even though, like flipping 
burgers, the job of most lawyers is often tedious, it remains 
true that “perhaps once a month a lawyer may face a problem 
that cannot be handled by resort to the formulaic responses 
and the boilerplate that lawyer has deployed a hundred 
 
 67. Actually, that’s somewhat of an understatement: “Indeed, I think it is 
shitty, politically repressive, contrary to what I see as the point to an education—
giving one a purchase on the world so that one may try to choose, or in default 
make, one’s place in it—and generally cowardly, in that it avoids explicit 
justification of social practices.” John Henry Schlegel, A Certain Narcissism; A 
Slight Unseemliness, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 595, 607 (1992). 
 68. Schlegel, supra note 3. 
 69. Id. at 453.  
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times before.” In such circumstances, “[j]udgment, craft, 
creativity, and even wit occasionally may be found highly 
useful, even if not strictly required.”70 
Schlegel sees his job as a law teacher to lie, at least in 
part, in trying to get his students to develop such good 
judgment. He cannot develop it for them; it is something they 
must do for themselves. And it requires them to do more than 
merely master written material, whether in the form of 
cases, academic commentary, or anything else. Developing a 
sense of good lawyerly judgment requires “close, laborious, 
critical reading of texts; careful and self-critical reflection.”71 
It demands “critical thinking” in the sense that it requires 
one to engage with the world from a skeptical posture. This 
act involves, in Schlegel’s words, “reading against (and 
sometimes across) the grain, whether the grain is that of 
written materials, understandings of human behavior, or of 
human institutions in an attempt to gain a different 
perspective.”72 
But skepticism does not mean critique for its own sake. 
It is just as bad to apply some stock theoretical lens—
whether Marxist or Freudian or some other, more 
fashionable “theory”—to, say, a judicial opinion than it would 
be to apply a doctrinal filter that strips away everything but 
the application of a rule to a set of facts.73 Both would be 
“inimical to critical thought” because in neither case is the 
reader’s mind allowed the sort of free play necessary for 
genuine insight.  
Nor does such insight involve the mere discovery of 
something out in the world. Rather, it emerges from a 
complex interplay of mind and world.74 The inquiry thus 
 
 70. Id. at 454.  
 71. Id. at 455  
 72. Id. at 455 n. 14. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Schlegel, supra note 65, at 443 (endorsing the view that “the mind has a 
constitutive role that it plays in perception,” so that “[w]hat the subject perceives 
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involves not a small amount of “exploring the content of one’s 
own head,” in a way that most law students do not quite 
grasp.75 
Another way to put the point would be to say that good 
judgment, or prudence, is an ethical as well as an intellectual 
virtue. That means human responsibility takes center 
stage.76 Exercising judgment in legal practice will require 
Schlegel’s students to “put[] their butt on the line, by 
exercising the best possible judgment in circumstances 
where answers are unlikely and advice only possible in terms 
of better or worse alternatives.”77 And that means accepting 
responsibility when things don’t work out as planned: “A 
lawyer who exercises judgment accepts the risk that the 
advice given will be less than optimum, even wrong, and so 
accepts the blame that follows from poor judgment.”78 In 
short, like Henry, Schlegel sees law as a “prudential” science 
of sorts.  
Of course, Schlegel’s vision of what a good legal 
education actually looks like is not the same as Henry’s. Far 
from it.79 In a symposium from the early 1990s, Schlegel 
imagined a law school based on books “about law”—or offered 
from an “external” (his quotes) perspective on the legal 
system80—the aim of which would be to teach students “the 
regularities in what lawyers do across practice specialties 
and, if well done, across legal regimes.” It would offer courses 
on “the structure of the legal profession or on the economic 
 
‘out there’ is not what is ‘really’ out there, but only what the mind is somehow 
‘able’ to see”).  
 75. Schlegel, supra note 3, at 455. 
 76. See cf. Ralph McInerny and John O’Callaghan, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (“Prudence is an intellectual virtue 
since it bears upon the goal of truth in the good ordering of action.”). 
 77. Schlegel, supra note 3, at 453. 
 78. Id. at 464. 
 79. See Schlegel, supra note 67, at 609 (treating Hart as a foil).  
 80. Id. at 607.  
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and social system in which it is embedded.”81 Such a law 
school, Schlegel argued, would offer students a better legal 
education because it would give them a more theoretical 
perspective, thereby offering them intellectual “tools with 
which to work for the duration of an honorable professional 
life.”82 This is not your father’s Legal Process course.  
But that’s just the point.83 Because we live in Herbert’s 
world, Schlegel’s idea of training lawyers using materials 
that look at law from such an “external” perspective is 
difficult to even make sense of. Hardly surprising, then, that 
Robert Post concluded in a comment in the same symposium 
that Schlegel’s effort to use “external” scholarship for the 
sake of improving legal education and practice, rendered him 
“paralyzed, half in and half out of the traditional legal 
academy.”84 Post saw Schlegel as caught in a “self-defeating 
tension.”  
That seems exactly half right. It’s certainly a tension. 
But although that tension can be uncomfortable, it need not 
be self-defeating. Recall that in the pragmatist view, the 
Essential Dilemma is just part of the human condition, 
unresolvable in the abstract and yet inescapable in 
particulars. So understood, facing it can lead to productive 
and creative thought. Jerome Frank called it a posture of 
“painful suspension,” which he thought critical for 
intellectual advance.85 Schlegel once described it to me, in 
discussing the CLS movement, as a “vibration” that those in 
the CLS movement experienced—one between their deep 
 
 81. Id. at 604.  
 82. Id. at 607. 
 83. A point I have made before. See Barzun, supra note 5, at 1283–85. 
 84. Robert Post, Legal Scholarship and the Practice of Law, 63 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 615, 622 (1992).  
 85. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 172–73 (1963) (endorsing, and 
ascribing to Hans Vaihinger, the view that the most advanced (but least 
comfortable) stage of human development is one in which “it is recognized that 
although thought may not be in complete correspondence with factual reality, it 
may lead to ultimate practical coincidence with the facts of existence”). 
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moral convictions and their equally deep doubts as to how 
they could ever rationally justify those convictions.86 
Under this view, then, we would see Schlegel’s imagined 
law school as simply a rival hypothesis as to what particular 
habits, skills, methods and ideas are properly cultivated in 
law students. We would test that hypothesis in the only way 
possible—by trying it out and comparing its fruits against 
those of the traditional methods, for the students, for legal 
practice, and for society. That is no easy task because it 
would require those teaching such courses to have the 
courage of their convictions and to preach (in class) what 
they practice (in their scholarship). It was precisely 
Schlegel’s lack of confidence in the typical CLS scholar’s will 
or capacity to do so that made him skeptical of the likelihood 
of such a law school actually coming into existence. 
Professor Post may have worried (and perhaps Henry 
would have as well) that such an approach, if adopted 
pervasively, would threaten the very existence of the legal 
order, shaking students’ faith in the reality, and therefore 
value, of the “rule of law.” But for his part, Schlegel thought 
the legal system could handle it. “[C]ontrary to most of my 
intellectual friends,” he explained, “I think the law would 
likely survive such criticism.”87 The reason, at least in part, 
is that books “about law” are just as vulnerable to skeptical 
doubts as is mainstream legal practice and theory.  
This last point leads to yet another example where we 
can see the same creative tension at work. Take Schlegel’s 
view of legal history, a field to which he himself has made 
significant contributions.88 Schlegel has long insisted that 
intellectual history would be improved by treating it as a 
“history of intellectuals,” rather than one of ideas.89 Now, the 
 
 86. Whether Schlegel’s is an idiosyncratic account of CLS I cannot say. 
 87. Schlegel, supra note 67, at 607. 
 88. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE (2011). 
 89. See, e.g., Schlegel, supra note 65, at 435; see also id., at 453–67.  
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suggestion that one can only understand ideas from the past 
by examining the social context in which they arose in some 
ways reflects (again) the belief in the interdependence of 
facts and values, objective and subjective, theoretical and 
practical reasoning that marks the pragmatist tradition to 
which I have suggested both Schlegel and Henry belong.90 It 
is also more or less conventional wisdom today among legal 
and intellectual historians generally, many of whom have 
used it as a basis for undermining the doctrines and concepts 
of legal practice by revealing its historical contingency.91 
But what makes Schlegel stand apart is that he is 
equally concerned to make the same point about the 
historians themselves. For him, such contextualized 
accounts and contingency-exposing critiques do not offer 
“true” accounts of legal practice or (therefore) a secure basis 
from which to issue a final verdict on legal practice. After all, 
those accounts can be contextualized, and the contingency of 
those critiques can be exposed, in precisely the same manner. 
Historians are intellectuals, too. As Schlegel recently put it, 
in typically colorful language, “[w]e are always trapped by 
our past and our present, by our race and ethnicity, our 
gender and sexual orientation, our education and class 
position, our toilet training and other rebellions.”92 This fact 
does not undermine historical inquiry; instead, it gives us a 
reason to celebrate it:  
 
 90. See, e.g., James T. Kloppenberg, Thinking Historically: A Manifesto of 
Pragmatic Hermeneutics, 9 MOD. INT. HIST. 201, 202 (2012) (“Every text must be 
studied in relation to its author or authors, particular persons existing in a 
particular time and place, and interpreted as the embodiment of a particular set 
of practices and purposes.”). 
 91. For an example in the legal domain, see MARK GRABER, TRANSFORMING 
FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991) (drawing 
on the work of Quentin Skinner to contextualize, and criticize the “social interest” 
justification for protecting free speech). Charles L. Barzun, Politics or Principle? 
Zechariah Chafee and the Social Interest in Free Speech, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 
269 (criticizing Graber’s account).  
 92. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, SEZ WHO? CRITICAL LEGAL HISTORY WITHOUT A 
PRIVILEGED POSITION IN OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 578 
(Markus D. Dubber & Christopher Tomlins, eds. Oxford University Press 2018). 
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[B]eing trapped does not mean that we have no obligation to do our 
very best to understand the many worlds of the people in our 
various stories about the past. We need to understand, and not in 
caricature, simultaneously both the workers and the capitalists, the 
feminists and the misogynists, the racists and the objects of their 
vilification. This is not because their beliefs and actions are of equal 
value—our writing ultimately discloses how we value them, as it 
should—but because they are all humans, all trapped in their past 
and present just as we historians are.93 
If Schlegel’s view about the limits of our own knowledge 
is right, then it’s a lot harder to launch devastating 
critiques—at least in the short run—because the ground 
from which one launches the attack is always vulnerable to 
crumbling underneath.94 
The point can be generalized. Some of those sympathetic 
to CLS-style critiques tend to fetishize other disciplines, 
seeing them as sources of purer forms of knowledge, 
uncorrupted by the professional pressures that distort 
scholarly efforts and produce “law-office history.”95 Schlegel, 
though, recognizes that scholars in all fields are susceptible 
to institutional and professional pressures, rendering their 
perspectives on legal practice just as partial and potentially 
distorted as those of lawyers and law professors. Academics, 
too, have bills to pay, promotions to secure, and thus, 
intellectual turf to protect.96 
 
 93. Id. at 578. 
 94. Id. (answering “no” to the question, which he attributes to Barry 
Cushman, “Can you name a successful critical reform movement that devoted a 
lot of effort to analyzing and critiquing its own animating foundational 
assumptions?”).  
 95. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: 
An Uneasy Relationship, 18 Yale J. L. & Human. 155, 165 (2006) (defining “law-
office history” as the mining of a historical record to support one’s own legal 
conclusion). 
 96. John Henry Schlegel, If the Music Hadn’t Stopped, or Reflections on the 
Great Kerfuffle: Historicism’s Continuing Grasp for Truth, YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 
(forthcoming, 2020) (manuscript at 3) (on file with authors) (observing in the rise 
of academic disciplines in the early 20th century, “[e]ach group began by staking 
out part of the intellectual world as its ‘turf,’ adopting a particular way of looking 
at that turf, a method as it were, and moving to cut out the ‘amateurs’ who 
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To make such observations is not to indict the integrity 
of other disciplines. It is merely to recognize that writing and 
teaching in history, literature, philosophy, political science, 
psychology, economics, or anything else is its own sort of 
craft, which involves not only mastering certain sources and 
methods but also expressing judgments about what does and 
does not matter. “In the classroom, if not elsewhere,” 
Schlegel points out, “a teacher is implicitly making a 
representation that whatever material is transmitted to 
one’s students is something worth acquiring, something 
worth paying for.”97 True, we can say that such 
representations reflect the “internal” point of view of 
whatever discipline is being taught. And so they do. But such 
a statement does not answer the question of whether the 
disciplinary perspective itself—its methods, materials, and 
assumptions—are worthwhile ones.  
That is why Schlegel sympathizes with Paul 
Carrington’s suggestion in 1984 that CLS scholars should 
resign their posts in law schools.98 True, Carrington was 
wrong on the merits, because he profoundly misunderstood 
what CLS scholars believed and were arguing for (he had 
mistakenly thought them nihilists).99 He was right, though, 
to underscore the inescapably ethical component of the 
scholarly debate over CLS. “For a scholar who understood 
that it is not possible to establish the Truth of scholarship,” 
Schlegel recognizes, “Carrington’s proposition has more 
bite.”100 That is because they see that what they write and 
teach as an expression of who they are and what they value. 
Which is all just to say that what is true for the law 
student preparing for practice is also true for the law 
professor, teacher, and scholar. As Lon Fuller, a 
 
formerly had a claim to that turf”). 
 97. Id. at 20.  
 98. See id. 
 99. See id.  
 100. Id. at 20–21.  
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contemporary and friend of both Harts, put it, the only gospel 
for both groups is that “there is no gospel that will save us 
from the pain of deciding at every step.”101 To raise a 
question, to treat it as worthy of investigation, and to devote 
one’s time to investigating it are all simultaneously decisions 
about what to do and what to believe. 
*** 
But why think that the “pain” (or Schlegel’s “vibration”) 
that facing the Essential Dilemma head-on produces is more 
likely to bear fruit than result in self-defeat? Here I offer no 
argument. The thought that it will, I think, rests on a kind 
of faith. The hope is that by confronting (rather than evading 
through an intellectual division of labor) the felt 
contradictions in our deeply held beliefs—tensions between 
and among our most deeply held moral convictions and 
epistemic commitments—we can somehow gain insight and 
understanding.102 That means, as it applies to law, that it is 
a faith which underlies both (1) the ambition to conceive of 
law as an “autonomous discipline” and (2) the refusal to 
accept as final the particular and contingent way that the 
modern academy has carved up intellectual life and 
packaged it for progress. And it is a faith exhibited by those 
who strive mightily (even if unsuccessfully) to reconcile those 
contradictions (as Henry did) and those who proceed in full, 
conscious awareness of the impossibility of doing so (as 
 
 101. Lon L. Fuller, The Place and Uses of Jurisprudence in the Law School 
Curriculum, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 495, 507 (1949). 
 102. Cf. NAGEL, supra note 35, at 4 (“Certain forms of perplexity—for example, 
about freedom, knowledge, and the meaning of life—seem to me to embody more 
insight than any of the supposed solutions to those problems.”). Cf. Schlegel, 
supra note 92, at 578–89 (“As a utopian I believe that when not in a Maoist mode, 
self-criticism would more fully reflect the position that scholars, especially the 
historians whose work I know and love, are in when and whatever they write. 
And I hope that such more capacious reflection on the limitations of positionality 
just might allow our critique to be effective for more than the statutory fifteen 
minutes of Warholian fame.”). 
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Schlegel does).103 
If those seem like strange, perhaps even paradoxical, 
pairings, then consider one final point. Although throughout 
this Essay I’ve described this posture towards the Essential 
Dilemma as “pragmatist,” another label would be humanist. 
That term is a contested one, and I will not defend here either 
my use of it, or the implication that law properly belongs to 
the “humanities.” Suffice it to say that the spirit intended is 
well captured by Leonard Cohen in his lyrics that Schlegel 
quotes in a different, though I think related, context:  
There’s a crack, a crack in everything. That’s how the 
light gets in.104 
  
 
 103. Cf. Charles L. Barzun, Jerome Frank, Lon Fuller, and a Romantic 
Pragmatism, 29 YALE J. LAW & HUMAN. 101, 129 (2017) (making an analogous, 
perhaps even identical, claim about two other legal thinkers not typically classed 
together). 
 104. LEONARD COHEN, ANTHEM (Columbia Records 1992). See Schlegel, supra 
note 3, at 472. 
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APPENDIX: Klein Bottle (shape with only one side) 
 
 
